Physics peeks into the ballot box by Fortunato, Santo & Castellano, Claudio
ar
X
iv
:1
21
0.
24
26
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  8
 O
ct 
20
12
Physics peeks into the ballot box
Santo Fortunato1, 2 and Claudio Castellano3, 4
1Department of Biomedical Engineering and Computational Science,
School of Science, Aalto University, P.O. Box 12200, FI-00076, Espoo, Finland
2Complex Networks and Systems Lagrange Lab, ISI Foundation, Via Alassio 11/C, 10126 Torino, Italy
3Istituto dei Sistemi Complessi (ISC-CNR), Via dei Taurini 19, I-00185 Roma, Italy
4Dipartimento di Fisica, Sapienza Universita` di Roma, P.le A. Moro 2, I-00185 Roma, Italy
Electoral results show universal features, such as statistics of candidates’ performance and turnout
rates, in different countries and over time. Are voters as predictable as atoms?
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k
The idea that humans, in particular circumstances,
might behave like social atoms, i.e. they might obey rules
that yield predictable collective patterns, just like atoms
and molecules, dates back many years and has several
illustrious fathers, like political philosopher John Stuart
Mill and social scientists Auguste Comte and Adolphe
Quetelet. The principle is that, when a great multitude
of individuals interact, the choice of each of them, which
in principle is free, is constrained by the presence of the
others, and regular collective behaviors may emerge. In
the last two decades this idea has developed into a flour-
ishing field of investigation, due to the unprecedented
availability of large datasets on social phenomena, and
powerful computers to process them. Statistical physics,
developed to deal with systems composed of many parti-
cles, has naturally provided a conceptual framework for
understanding such systems, even if here nothing less
than humans are the elementary constituents. Clearly,
such an endeavor does not come without obstacles. The
complexity of individual “social atoms” and the intricacy
of their interactions rule out the possibility to formulate
principles and laws as rigorous as in the physics of mat-
ter. Nevertheless, regular patterns in collective social
phenomena abound, and they call for explanations, ide-
ally via simple models.
Works of physicists on elections started to appear in
the late 90s. As of now, many different types of elec-
tions in several contries have been studied and modelled,
and various issues have been addressed. In this study we
discuss recent results on the competition between can-
didates in proportional elections and on the statistics of
turnout rates.
I. THE PERFORMANCE OF CANDIDATES
In electoral competitions many candidates compete for
one or few seats. Their success can range from landslide
victory to complete failure with only a handful of votes
received. How does this huge variability come about?
In 1999 Costa Filho et al. studied vote statistics in
Brazilian Parliamentary proportional elections. In this
kind of elections, at odds with what occurs in the US,
in each electoral district, a few to a few dozens seats are
awarded simultaneously, and the number of seats won by
a party is proportionate to the number of votes received.
Costa Filho et al. considered all candidates, winners and
losers, regardless of their electoral district or political af-
filiation and computed the histogram of the number of
votes received by each of them. In the central range of
the number of votes, the histogram has a regular pro-
file, where the number of candidates receiving v votes
appears inversely proportional to v. This means that the
number of candidates who obtained 1000 votes, say, is
approximately 10 times higher than the number of can-
didates who collected 10000 votes. This type of analy-
sis neglects a factor that is fundamental in the political
life of most countries: the influence of parties. A great
deal of the electoral success of a candidate depends on
the popularity of the party’s political agenda he/she is
running for. The observed histogram reflects the com-
plex intertwined effect of the competition among parties
and the competition among different candidates within
parties. Given the peculiarities of the specific political
landscape of each country, one can hardly expect to see
similar results across different countries.
For this reason, we have proposed a different analysis
for proportional elections where voters select a party and
in addition express a preference for one of the candidates
within the party list. To disentangle the role of the party
and the role of the candidate, the key variable is not the
absolute candidate performance, expressed by the num-
ber of votes obtained, but the performance relative to
the average performance of competitors within the same
party. For each party list, we divide the number v of
votes collected by each candidate by the average score
v0 of all candidates in the list. The histogram of the
relative performance v/v0 turns out to be not only very
stable for different elections in the same country, but also
across countries [Fig. 1 (left)]. The generality of this re-
sult, and the stability of the performance curve over more
than half a century, suggests that we are facing a basic
feature of social dynamics, independent of the cultural,
historical, economic and technological context where the
elections took place.
We model the electoral campaign of candidates as a
word-of-mouth process, starting from the candidates and
branching out to the community of voters, through their
2social relationships. Each candidate convinces his/her
immediate contacts with a certain probability r. Only
voters who have not yet made up their mind may be
convinced to choose a candidate. Convinced voters, in
turn, become activists and campaign in favor of the can-
didate they have chosen. The number of contacts of each
individual is a random variable k, broadly distributed as
p(k) ∼ k−α to account for the large variability in personal
inclinations and social stance.
The process stops when each voter has picked a can-
didate. The model yields a distribution of candidates’
performance which matches well the empirical one [Fig.
1 (left)] and is rather robust with respect to variations of
the parameters r and α. It turns out that the most suc-
cessful candidates are those who manage to acquire the
largest number of voters in the initial stages of the pro-
cess. Indeed, with an initially high number of activists
on their side, they may target and eventually gain a high
number of supporters, thus limiting the opportunities of
their competitors.
II. TURNOUT RATES
Imitation and adaptation are the main features of the
social atom, and frequently overrule the individual free-
dom to make decisions. Knowing how people’s decisions
are affected by those of their contacts is fundamental in
marketing, policy making, panic situations, etc. Borghesi
et al. have used space-resolved election data to address
this issue. They focused on the main decision of a voter:
shall I vote or not? Turnout statistics are available at the
municipal level for many countries and years. For each
municipality one can easily extract the geographical lo-
cation as well. In this way it is possible to check whether
there are spatial correlations between turnout rates of
different towns, i.e. whether the decision of many people
to go to vote (or not to go) in one place is related to the
behavior of the voters in nearby places.
Borghesi et al. studied the logarithm of the ratio be-
tween the number of registered voters who participated in
each election and the number of those who did not. The
histogram of this variable, called logarithmic turnout rate
(LTR), is a skewed bell-shaped curve that, after proper
rescaling, is essentially the same in different countries
and elections, for municipalities having approximately
the same population. The main result of the analysis,
however, is that participation to elections is not indepen-
dent in different places. Turnout rates are correlated over
long ranges in space [Fig. 1 (right)]: quantitatively, the
correlation function of LTR decays logarithmically with
the distance r between the locations (C(r) ∼ lnL/r),
where L is of the order of the size of the country.
The phenomenology uncovered can be reproduced in
terms of a decision model where a voter actually partic-
ipates to the election only if his own propensity to vote
overcomes a threshold. The propensity of each voter is
modeled as a continuous unbounded variable, resulting
from the sum of three contributions: an idiosyncratic dis-
position (specific to each individual and varying in time),
a city-dependent term (with short-scale spatial correla-
tions) and a slowly varying “cultural field”. The latter
transports (in space) and keeps the memory (in time) of
the collective intentions and is responsible for the long-
range spatial correlations of turnout rates. The evolution
of this cultural field is affected by two types of mecha-
nisms. People travel to neighbouring cities and inter-
act with acquaintances, carrying their own local cultural
specificity and exchanging ideas and beliefs. In so doing,
cultural differences between near areas tend to narrow
and this implies that the cultural field undergoes a dif-
fusion process over geographically separated locations.
The mood of the community in a given area may also be
influenced by special events, like the closing down of a
factory, or the construction of new infrastructure, which
can be modeled by a random noise term. The cultural
field thus obeys a diffusion equation in the presence of
random noise, whose solution, after a transient leading
to stationarity, displays the same spatial correlation pro-
file found in the electoral data. The fit of the model pre-
dictions with the empirical distributions reveals that the
equilibration time of the cultural field dynamics is very
long, of the order of a century, which is consistent with
the observed historical persistence of the voting habits in
different areas of a country.
The findings we have discussed confirm that elections
are phenomena that can be understood quantitatively
with the concepts and tools of physics. This new line of
research has just started to scratch the surface of the
wealth of information contained in electoral data. It
promises to shed light on the decisional processes of vot-
ers, with potential strong impact on the policy of govern-
ments and parties, the design of electoral systems and the
organization of political campaigns.
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Figure 1: (Left) Histogram of the performance of a candidate with respect to the average score of his/her party competitors in
proportional Parliamentary elections with open lists. The resulting pattern is the same in different countries and years, hinting
to the presence of a simple underlying mechanism behind the candidates’ competition. A model based on word-of-mouth
spreading describes well the universal curve (black dots). @ 2007 from the American Physical Society. (Right) Heat map of the
turnout rates for the 2004 European Parliament election in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Red and blue indicate
municipalities with high and low turnout rates, respectively. The pattern is heterogeneous and displays long-range correlations
between different geographical areas: locations with high (low) turnout are likely to be in geographical proximity of locations
with high (low) turnout.
